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Abstract  
The primary focus of this study is on the relationship between idiosyncratic risk and corpo-
rate governance. A secondary focus of the study is on the relationship between firm performance 
and corporate governance. Then, a potential corporate governance-to-idiosyncratic volatility-to-firm 
performance link is considered. In this study, corporate governance is approached in the context of 
internal governance control, based on board structure, composition, ownership, ownership structure, 
audit committee structure and quality. These are the essential elements of corporate governance, and 
relevant for studies pertaining to a market with internal-governance characteristics, such as the Pa-
kistan market. The market of Pakistan provides a unique study that is based on market with its dis-
tinct characteristics. It is the market with internal-governance-control characteristics that operates in 
an internal-governance-control system. Therefore, this study has applied data draw form firms listed 
under the aforementioned of the Pakistan Securities Exchange (PSE). The data used in this study are 
taken from the PSE, the 104 listed firms for the year’s 2004-2016. The primary conclusion of the 
study is that there is a clear relationship between idiosyncratic risk and corporate governance. Spe-
cifically, this study finds consistent and significant relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and 
a number of firm-level corporate governance variables. The variables include among others, CEO 
duality, firm size and leverage. Thus, based on these conclusions, a link between corporate gover-
nance, idiosyncratic volatility, and firm performance is implied. The results show that the firms with 
batter corporate governance mechanisms tend to have a lower idiosyncratic risk. The current studies 
differ from previous studies on idiosyncratic risk, and also previous corporate governance studies, in 
its focus on a relationship between idiosyncratic and corporate governance in the context of internal 
governance controls, and the significant finding and conclusion. Hence, this study adds a valuable 
contribution to the knowledge and literature on the relationship between idiosyncratic risk and cor-
porate governance, and also to the streams of literature on both idiosyncratic risk, and corporate go-
vernance. 
Keywords: Idiosyncratic Risk, Corporate Governance, Dynamic Penal Regression, Firm 
Performance, Ownership Structure, Board Structure, Audit Committee Structure 
 
Introduction 
The risk is a part of each one human life. From the moment we get up in the morning, drive 
or take open transportation to find the opportunity to class or to work until the point that the moment 
that we get over into our beds (and possibly a brief timeframe later), we are displayed to threats of 
different degrees. What makes the study of risk fascinating is that while some of this risk bearing 
may not be completely voluntary, we seek out some risks on our own (speeding on the highways or 
gambling, for instance) and enjoy them. While some of these risks may have all the earmarks of be-
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ing immaterial, others have a tremendous impact on the way, we encounter our lives. On a fair and 
excellent thought note, it can be fought that every genuine advance in human improvement, from the 
mountain man's development of mechanical assemblies to quality treatment, has been made possible 
in light of the way that some individual was anxious to go for broke and challenge the norm. In this 
part, we start our investigation of risk by noticing its essence through history and after that take a 
gander from an optimistic standpoint to characterize what we mean by risk. 
“The probability that an actual return on an investment will be lower than the expected re-
turn. The chance that an exact yield on a purchase will be below the proposed interest. Financial risk 
is divided into the successive categories: Basic risk, Political risk, Capital risk, Default risk, Sove-
reign risk, Economic risk, Interest rate risk, Liquidity risk, Country risk, Exchange rate risk, Pay-
ment arrangement risk, Delivery risk, Settlement risk, Refinancing risk, Re-Contribution risk, and 
underwriting risk, Operations risk.”  (Smart, Gitman, & Megginson, 2007). 
 There are major two types of risk. Systematic risk and unsystematic risk. Systematic risk is 
uncontrollable by an organization because it is macro in nature.  
“The other name of systematic risk is “Market Risk” or “Un-diversifiable Risk,” is the uncer-
tainty natural to the whole market or whole market segment. And referred to as volatility, systematic 
risk exists of the everyday change in a stock’s price.” (Smart, Gitman, & Megginson, 2007). 
Unsystematic risk is controllable by an organization as it has nature of micro level.  
“Unsystematic risk it is also called “Specific Risk” “Diversifiable Risk” or “Residual Risk,” 
can be defined as “It is can kind of uncertainty which exists with the industry or company when an-
ybody invests in”.  It can be minimized through diversification.” (Gitman, & Megginson, 2007). 
The definition of idiosyncratic risk can be defined by (Lo & Wang, 2008); 
“Idiosyncratic risk, also indicate to as unsystematic risk, is the risk that is endemic to an 
appropriate asset such as stock and not an entire investment portfolio. Idiosyncratic risk can be 
reduced throughout diversification in an investment portfolio.”   
Corporate governance elaborates as; 
“Corporate governance is the structure of regulation, processes, and measure by which a 
company is controlled and directed. Corporate governance basically engages in balancing the benefit 
of an organization many stakeholders, financiers, like shareholders, consumers, suppliers, manage-
ment, government and the community” by (Shailer, 2004). 
 
Background of Study 
Research on CG has gotten extensive consideration in the previous decade or so because of 
the noteworthy capacity of CG in improving the organizations' performance. Research has examined 
the effect of different CG measures have been on firm execution and firm esteem. CG measures sim-
ilar to board structure, pay structure, and possession structure are dictated by each other, and by fac-
tors, for example, chance, money streams, firms' size and controls and so forth. These factors like-
wise unequivocally impact a company's performance (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
BASEL III proposed to fortify CG to keep the risk happening from the related to the 
financial industry. Furthermore, past investigations likewise show that CG fills in as a type of a sys-
tem, protect minority investors and stakeholders, and upgrade the wealth of investors. Lin, et al. 
(2010) determined that through the outline of the CG instrument could diminish the agency problem 
and reduction idiosyncratic risk. Firms with better CG systems have less agency problem. The idio-
syncratic risk of the firm and capital expenses would be decreased, along these lines improving cor-
porate performance and wealth of shareholder. Henceforth, if financial industry related foundations 
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set up better CG systems can diminish the risk to enhance the financial industry condition and to 
maintain a strategic distance from the negligence of the financial industry.  
Notwithstanding, the written works with respect to the impacts of CG quality on the risk of 
financial related institutions is a need. Besides, in the wake of investigating the writing, various ex-
aminations have concentrated on investigating the connection between incomplete CG systems and 
firm performance. Scarcely any examinations have clarified the connection between CG and risk. 
Along these lines, to make up the crevice in the written works, this investigation gives coordinate 
observational confirmations of the impacts of CG quality on risk. This paper takes after Lin et al. 
(2010) to utilize idiosyncratic risk as the intermediary for the level of risk in the financial industry. 
The idiosyncratic risk speaks to the risk interface with how the financial organizations work their 
own business and system.  
In this examination, the financial holding industry, managing a banking industry, and the 
securities industry in Taiwan was the do research subjects. Empirical evidence was utilized to dis-
sect the connection between financial CG instruments and idiosyncratic risk. Flannery and Hankins 
(2013) demonstrated that dynamic penal data regression has turned out to be progressively crucial in 
the corporate finance field. What's more, if clarified variables of slack periods are incorporated in 
the independent variable, dynamic penal data regression must be utilized to maintain a strategic dis-
tance from one-sided parameter estimate. Hence, this paper adjusted the empirical model by Lin et 
al. (2010) and utilized dynamic penal data regression in this investigation. This examination also 
referred to Arellano and Bond (1991) and directed the generalized method of moments (GMM) re-
gression to estimate the regression parameters. Besides, the Sargan test was utilized to look at the 
adequacy of the instrumental variables received by the dynamic penal data regression.  
Corporate governance covers many aspects including issues to do in an organization charter, 
legal framework, distribution of ownership right, or the right of financial and non-financial stake-
holder. It is a structured method of company policies, controls, procedures, and compliances that are 
put in place for the protection of shareholder, furthermore for the prevention and resolution of con-
flicts of interest. 
Corporate governance is concerned with the security of the company and its shareholder, and 
ultimately the entire stakeholder (Denis & McConnell, 2003; Donaldson, 1990; Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997; Turnbull, 1997 & 2002). Also from a purefinance perspective, corporate governance attempts 
to given a safe environment, by which shareholder and other financial stakeholders can be also con-
fident of receiving a return on investment (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
The relationship between idiosyncratic risk and CG is the primary focus of this study. How-
ever, the current study does not focus on the information content of idiosyncratic risk establish by 
Ferreira and Laux (2007), nor governance policy on anti-takeover provisions. The current study, in-
stead, examines the relationship between idiosyncratic risk and corporate governance, in terms of 
idiosyncratic returns volatility and corporate governance in the context of internal governance con-
trols. The study internal governance controls based on board size, ownership contraction, board 
meeting, audit committee meeting, board independent, institutional ownership, CEO duality and au-
dit committee independence is appropriate for a market with internal governance control characteris-
tics such as the Pakistan market. Therefore, the relationship between idiosyncratic risk and corporate 
governance in the context of a market with internal governance control characteristics is the primary 
focus of the study. 
The literature mainly part concentrates on investigating the impacts of the CG system on op-
eration performance or conceptually explains the impact of parts of the CG system on idiosyncratic 
risk. These examinations have neglected to look at the impacts of the whole CG mechanism on idio-
syncratic risk. Just Lin et al. (2010) utilized general industry as the exploration subject and exhaus-
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tively centered on the impact of internal and external CG mechanism idiosyncratic risk. In any case, 
they didn’t study in the financial industry. Since the financial sector is an established industry and is 
firmly identified with people in general, a firm should have a solid CG mechanism. We led a 
complete examination to decide how the CG mechanism and idiosyncratic risk. This investigation 
can fill in as a source of perspective for government agencies and financially related organizations in 
advancing CG with the goal that the embodiment of CG can be actualized to keep up shareholders 




The agency theory is a supposition that clarifies the connection amongst principals and 
agents in the business. The principal-agent relationship is essentially a separation of ownership and 
control, between the principal (shareholder/owner) and the agent (management). This potentially 
problematic relationship exists when an agent is appointed to act on behalf of the principle (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973).   
Therefore, the agency problem is a serious problem for corporations that must be addressed 
and controlled. The fundamental aim of corporate governance is to ensure that managers put the in-
terests of the firm and its shareholders before their own, and to help ensure that all financial stake-
holders get a return on their financial investments (Fama & Jensen, 1883a; Fama & Jensen, 1883b; 
Jensen & Mackling, 1976; Ross, 1973; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  
Stewardship Theory  
Stewardship theory is a theory that manger, left all own, will, in reality, go about as capable 
stewards of the benefits they control.  
The theory behind the stewardship model is that firm performance and the value will be 
maximised when managersare empowered with trust, authority,andresponsibility, and have a shared 
vision for the firm’s success (Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997; Donaldson & Davis, 1991; 
Haniffa & Cook, 2002; Keasey & Wright,1997). Good corporate governance fosters stewardship, 
and firm an appropriate balance between control and motivation (Keasey & Wright, 1997). 
 
Research Questions 
Is there a relationship between idiosyncratic risk and corporate governance in a market with 
internal-governance-control characteristics?  
Is there a connection between idiosyncratic risk and board meeting? 
Is there an association between idiosyncratic risk and Institutional ownership?  
Is there a bond between idiosyncratic risk and board size? 
Is there a correlation between idiosyncratic risk and CEO Duality? 
Is there a correlation between idiosyncratic risk and audit committee meeting? 
Is there a connection between idiosyncratic risk and audit committee independence? 
Is there a connection between idiosyncratic risk and concentration ownership?  
 
Research Objectives 
To investigate the relationship between corporate governance and idiosyncratic risk. 
To examine the impact of board size and idiosyncratic risk. 
To explore the effect of audit committee meeting and idiosyncratic risk. 
To study the impact of audit committee independence and idiosyncratic risk. 
To explore the association among of board meeting and idiosyncratic risk. 
 
Sadeen Ghafoor, Muhammad Zulfiqar, Muhammad Kashif Khurshid 
 
Openly accessible at http://www.european-science.com                                                                   228 
 
To investigate the relationship among ownership concentration and idiosyncratic risk. 
To explore the involvement between CEO Duality and idiosyncratic risk. 
To examine the impact of board independence and idiosyncratic risk. 
To study the impact of institutional ownership and idiosyncratic risk. 
 
The aim of the Study 
To date, very little work has been dedicated to the study of an association between idiosyn-
cratic risk and corporate governance. According to my knowledge, the correlation involving idio-
syncratic risk and corporate governance has not researched yet, in the context of a market with in-
ternal-governance-control characteristics, such as the Pakistani market. Therefore, the secondary 
aim of this study is to review this relationship in this context. 
In this process, the secondary aim of this study is to explore this relationship between idio-
syncratic volatility and corporate governance, and also organization performance and CG. Then the 
study endeavors to explore a potential link between corporate governance, idiosyncratic volatility, 
and organization performance. Thus, this study aims to contribute, to the insight and understanding 
of the relationship between idiosyncratic risk and corporate governance for future corporate finance 
research and modeling.  
 
Literature review 
Empirical Literature Review 
The literature reveals that idiosyncratic risk is an important factor impacting on firms and 
market, equity return, firm value and performance (Draw et al. 2004; Draw et al. 2005; Fu, 2009; 
Goyal & Santa-Clara, 2003; Guo & Savickas, 2008; Malkiel & Xu, 1997; Miller et al. 2002). How-
ever for the market to develop and maintain optimal efficiency and value there also needs to be an 
effective corporate governance system in place. Hence, an important facet of idiosyncratic risk is the 
relationship between idiosyncratic risk and CG. 
A review of the literature reveals a sparseness of studies in this important area, particularly 
so for a well-functioning, organized and efficient market, such as the Pakistani market, which oper-
ates in an internal-governance controlled system. Therefore there is a need for research into the as-
sociation involving idiosyncratic risk and corporate governance in this context. This relationship is 
the primary focus of the study. 
Most of the writing investigates just the connection between halfway CG components and 
risk. With respect to CG components, empirical investigations have demonstrated that strong CG 
could minimums the capital expenses of firms; however, they neglected to clarify the connection 
between CG and the idiosyncratic risk of capital cost. Himmelberg et al. (1999) expressed that when 
managers had high shareholding proportion idiosyncratic risk was decreased. As to external gover-
nance system, Jin and Myers (2006) directed an empirical investigation from a national point of 
view. They found that organizations having less information transparency showed higher idiosyn-
cratic risk. Be that as it may, they didn't research the nature of firm-level governance and its conse-
quences for idiosyncratic risk. Additionally, Gasper and Messa (2006) utilized information got from 
CRSP Compustat to examine the impacts of product market competition on idiosyncratic risk. The 
investigation demonstrated that profoundly competitive product market displayed expanded idiosyn-
cratic risk. Ferreira and Laux (2007) investigated the impacts of the market for corporate control on 
idiosyncratic risk. The outcomes showed that organizations that had various hostile to takeover ar-
rangements had a low idiosyncratic risk. Dissimilar to past investigations, Lin et al. (2010) inspected 
the impacts that far-reaching CG, which included an internal and external system, has on idiosyn-
cratic risk. The outcomes showed that when the shareholding proportion by external block holders, 
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proportion of independent director and administrators on board, and shareholding proportion by di-
rectors were high, and when information was gotten in a timely way, at that point idiosyncratic risk 
was decreased. As it were, enhanced internal CG components successfully minimums idiosyncratic 
risk. Lawful regulation and item product market competitiveness have no generous impacts on idio-
syncratic risk, along these lines showing that external CG systems can't minimums idiosyncratic 
risk. 
Evidence of Pakistan 
Alam and shah (2013) explore the relationship among CG and firm risk on a sample of 106 
financial PSE listed firms over time of   6 years (2015-2010). They investigate that the negative rela-
tionship between firm risk and ownership structure, and CEO duality has a positive impact on the 
fire risk. 
Javed and Iqbal (2007) analyzed the cross-sectional association involved corporate 
governance and organization value of Pakistan stock. They have analyzed the relationship between 
the firm value calculated through Tobin’s Q and (CGI) corporate governance index. They analyzed 
that the corporate governance plays a great role in Pakistan, and all elements of corporate 
governanceare not important in Pakistan market.  
 
Methodology 
In this part present the research methodology, including the research question, data, and 
variables used in the study. The chapter provides a review of the methods and approaches found in 
the literature and methods relevant to this study. The chapter discusses the focus of the study, the 
theoretical motivation, aims of the study, and expected findings. The data selection, and 
identification, and a description of the variables are also contained in this chapter. 
This study is motivated by relevant aspect of corporate governance  theory, and aspect of 
theory pertaining to idiosyncratic risk. The study is also motivated by the findings of  Ferreira and 
Laux (2007) of an association involved idiosyncratic risk and corporate in us listed market. Also, the 
research is motivated by the sparseness of research in this important area, and the challenge this 
proses to test this finding in a market with internal-governance-control characteristics, such as the 
Pakistan market. 
Data 
Non-financial related establishments issued in the PSE (Pakistan Stock Exchange) were 
enrolled as studies focus, including independent firms listed of Pakistan Stock Exchange. Research 
information incorporated the Pakistan stock record, firm stock prices, and non-financial reports. All 
data collected from the Pakistan stock Exchange and Market Observation Post System in light of 
open issued recorded.  
The data is collected by the financial statement of non- financial sector listed in Pakistan 
stock exchange under SECP, (Securities Exchange Commission of Pakistan) based on the 12th 
year's annual report of each company from 2003 to 2015. 
The chosen index for our beta-calculation was PSE index, Pakistan stock price. This index 
contains all the stocks of the non-financial sector on PSE and therefore an appropriate measurement 
for beta calculation. 
Measurement of idiosyncratic risk 
This investigation takes after the immediate disintegration technique by Malkiel and Xu 
(2003) to the estimation of idiosyncratic risk. Moreover, by establishing up the market models, we 
evaluated the volatility arrangement of idiosyncratic and systemic risk. To determine the heterosce-
dasticity and heavy-tailed distribution dissemination designs worry that the succession of profits had 
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while assessing idiosyncratic risk, we utilized a GARCH model to change the immediate decay 
strategy by (Malkiel& Xu 2003). 
Yet, Volatility is time shifting and shows an asymmetric impact. Subsequently, a second 
technique to determine the idiosyncratic risk is a dynamic model like EGARCH (Exponential Gene-
ralized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity) keeping in mind the end goal to catch time 
variety. The EGARCH strategy is more reasonable than both ARCH and GARCH techniques, as it 
allows for anasymmetric reaction of volatility to stock returns. Moreover, dissimilar to GARCH, the 
EGARCH display, determined in logarithms, does not force the nation-negativity imperatives on 
parameters. The subsequent stage is to examine the Autoregressive Conditionally Heteroscedastic 
(ARCH) models that will likewise be utilized as a part of the displaying of Idiosyncratic Volatility 
in this examination.  
 
Table 1. Measurement of variables 
Sr. No Symbol Variables Measurement 
1 BS Board  members Number of inside and outside directors on the 
board (VO &PHAN, 2013) 
2 DUL CEO Duality 
 
Coded “1” if Chairman also holds the position 
of CEO and “0” otherwise (VO &PHAN, 
2013) 
3 NED Board indepen-
dence 
Number of non-executive directors on the 
board (VO &PHAN, 2013) 
4 BM Board meetings Board  meetings, number of board meetings 
held during the fiscal year (Juhmani, 2017) 
5 BO Board ownership The percentage of total shares on the issue 
held by employees, or by those with a sub-
stantial position in a company that provides 
significant voting power at an annual general 
meeting (Morck et al. 1998) 
6 ISH Institutional own-
ership 
Log of institutional ownership (Ahmad & Ju-
soh, 2014) 
7 OC Ownership con-
centration 
Concentration measures refer to holdings of 
largest block holder ((Earle et al. 2005) 
8 ACI Audit committee 
independence 
It is the ratio between non-executive directors 
in the audit committee and the total number of 
directors in the audit committee.(Alam & 
Shah, 2013) 
9 ACM Audit committee 
meeting 
Audit committee meetings, number of audit 
committee meetings held during the fiscal 
year (Juhmani, 2017) 
10 AQ Audit quality Coded “1” if audit  quality measure and  “0” 
otherwise (Juhmani, 2017) 
11 LVG Financial leve-
rage 
The ratio of total debt divided by equity (VO 
& PHAN, 2013) 
12 FS Firm size Natural logarithm of the book value of total 
assets (VO & PHAN, 2013) 
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Estimated Equation 
Ido௜௧ = ߙ + ߚ݀ݑ݈௜௧ + ߚܾ݋௜௧ + ߚ݅ݏℎ௜௧ + ߚ݋ܿ௜௧ + ߚܾݏ௜௧ + ߚ݊݁݀௜௧ + ߚܾ݉௜௧ + ߚܽܿ݅௜௧ + ߚܽܿ݉௜௧
+ ߚܽݍ௜௧ + ߚ݂ݏ௜௧ + ߚ݈ݒ݃௜௧ + µ௜௧ 
Hypothesis of study 
Hypothesis 0 
H0: There is a negative association between corporate governance and idiosyncratic risk. 
Hypothesis 1 
H1: There positive impact of corporate governance on idiosyncratic risk. 
ARCH (GARCH) and EGARCH model 
These 2 qualities are available in the ARCH model in view of the way restrictive variance is 
modeled, anywhere the error variance of the theoretical regression is thought to be reliant on the 
lagged squared miscalculation. The summed up ARCH (GARCH) model, created by Bollerslev 
(1986), is an augmentation of the ARCH model. In the GARCH model, contingent veranice might 
be relied upon its own particular in addition to legged inaccuracy, so the model permits data on 
precedent squared errors to impact present deviation without including multiple parameters. 
An instance of the GARCH (p,q) model can be experiential in Equation (3): 
௧ܻ = ߚఖ + ߚଵݔଵ௧ + ߚଶݔଶ௧ + ⋯ + ߚ௡ݔ௡௧ + µ௧,         µ௧˷ܰ(0, ߪ௧ଶ 
௧ܻ = ߙఖ + ߙଵµ௧ିଵଶ + ߙଶµ௧ିଶଶ + ⋯ + ߙ௤µ௧ି௤ଶ + ߚଵߪ௧ିଵଶ + ߚଶߪ௧ିଶଶ + ⋯ + ߚ௣ߪ௧ି௣ଶ  
Whereµ௧ and ߪ௧ଶare the regression’s errors and error variance, correspondingly. 
At last, the exponential GARCH (EGARCH) model proposed by Nelson (1991), an expan-
sion of the GARCH model, ought to be highlighted. The models have a series of points of interest, 
for example, the inconceivability of producing negative changes and allowing the presence of 
asymmetries in the model (leverage impact). The EGARCH (p,q) model, in common terms, can be 
write down as follows: 
 
௧ܻ = ߚఖ + ߚଵݔଵ௧ + ߚଶݔଶ௧ + ⋯ + ߚ௡ݔ௡௧ + µ௧,         µ௧˷ܰ(0, ߪ௧ଶ 
 
IN(σ୲ଶ) = ω + ෍ b
୮
୪ୀଵ




) + α [ µ୲ି୩σ2୲ି୩ −
ඨ2π]} 
In Equation, since the logarithm of variance is particular, σt2 will be a positive constant if 
the model’s parameters are negative. 
Because of its properties, which are splendidly appropriate to modeling volatility in financial 
series, the EGARCH demonstrate was utilized as a part of this examination as an optional method 
for evaluating idiosyncratic volatility. Since it gives a contingent variance series for every expected 
model, the EGARCH model is helpful as a method for evaluating estimated idiosyncratic volatility 
(Fu, 2009).  
 
Results  
Data analysis  
This study is adopted by the Panel data methodology. The combination of observation on 
cross-section data and time periods is from panel methodology. Panel study also provides the accu-
rate results with no detection in cross section or time series investigation. Panel data provides 
different equation from cross-section and time series analysis.  
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We used the Eviews5, to analyze corporate governance and idiosyncratic risk of Pakistan 
stock exchange. We have chosen to investigate the financial sector on the Pakistan stock exchange. 
There were 104 companies of the non-financial sector for which data of 104 was enlisted in the 
stock exchange. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics  
    Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
         ido 1248 -125.8021 224.7979 -1060.975 366.4407 
         dul 1248 .3309295 .4707364 0 1 
         bo 1248 .2353366 .2483031 0 .978732 
         ish 1248 .1255592 .1288728 0 .9676672 
         oc   1248 .6170081 .189478 .1506383 .9796879 
          bs 1248 7.85016 1.589606 3 15 
        ned 1248 .5885053 .2272497 0 1 
         bm 1248 5.344551 1.910978 0 18 
         aci 1248 .7578659 .2434004 0 1 
        acm 1248 2.950321 1.976388 0 8 
          aq 1248 .4591346 .498527 0 1 
          fs 1248 14.37427 1.615016 8.71029 19.19587 
         lvg 1248 .1819987 .2204641 0 2.727095 
 
In the above-given table, descriptive statistics of the study are depicted. Descriptive statistics 
table show for both dependent and independent variables. In this table maximum, minimum, mean 
and standard deviation values of all variables of study are shown; CEO duality is an independent 
variable of the study which is measured as the CEO also held’s the positions of chairman. The num-
bers of observations of this variable are 1248 during the time period of 2004 to 2016. The minimum 
value of the independent variable CEO duality individual is 0 and the maximum value is 1, which 
indicates there is the existence of data between two values. The value of the mean of individual 
CEO duality is .3309295 and the standard deviation is 0.4707.  
The second independent variable is Board ownership of the research which is measured as 
the stock ownership in a board member. The numbers of observations of this variable are 1248 dur-
ing the time period of 2004 to 2016. The minimum value of the independent variable Board owner-
ship is 0 and the maximum value is 0 .9787. The value of the mean of Board ownership is 0.2353 
and the standard deviation is 0. 2483. 
 
Table 3 Correlation matrix  
 ido dul bo ish oc bs ned bm aci acm aq aq lvg 
ido 1.0000             
dul -0.0465 1.0000            
bo -0.0434 0.2036 1.0000           
ish -0.0179 -0.0534 -0.2584 1.0000          
oc 0.0218 -0.0565 -0.1637 -0.0938 1.0000         
bs -0.0832 -0.1287 -0.1040 0.2141 -0.1632 1.0000        
ned -0.0300 -0.0839 -0.2113 0.0822 0.0072 0.0801 1.0000       
bm -0.1248 -0.0368 0.0770 -0.1127 0.0118 0.0957 -0.1532 1.0000      
aci -0.0229 -0.0640 -0.2207 0.1440 0.0602 0.1095 0.4203 -0.1276 1.0000     
acm -0.0026 0.0168 0.0471 -0.0653 0.0598 -0.0121 0.0310 0.0249 0.1028 1.0000    
aq 0.0703 -0.2550 -0.2948 0.1744 0.0871 0.1810 0.1103 0.0476 0.1686 0.1200 1.0000   
fs 0.0572 0.0042 0.0210 -0.0358 -0.1369 0.0222 -0.0622 0.0382 -0.0396 -0.0193 0.0234 1.0000  
lvg 0.0055 0.0255 0.0514 0.0400 -0.0434 0.0320 0.0419 0.0100 0.0324 0.0094 -0.0806 0.0392 1.0000 
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Table 3 shows that the correlation of coefficient between two variables. The sample of 34 
companies describes the observations of the firms from the period of 2008 to 2013. The variables 
has been defined by the correlation scale that if the values (0.0-0.3) defined that no correlation be-
tween variables and if the values (0.31-0.5) defined the weak correlation and if the values between 
(0.51-0.7) defined that a moderate correlation exists between variables and if the values between 
(0.71-1.00) showed that strong correlation of these variables. 
The above results showed that CEO duality and idiosyncratic risk have negative no correla-
tion. Negative effect between idiosyncratic risk and board ownership and defined the no relation be-
tween them. The more results showed that there is no relationship idiosyncratic risk and institutional 
ownership and define the negative effect between them. Positive effect between idiosyncratic risk 
and ownership concentration and defined the no relation between them. The idiosyncratic risk and 
board size defined negatively no relationship. The idiosyncratic risk and board independence nega-
tively affects but exist no relation between them. Board meeting also has no relation with idiosyn-
cratic risk and they are negatively affected on each other. The idiosyncratic risk and audit committee 
independence has no relationship but they are negatively effective. Other negatively effects involved 
idiosyncratic risk and audit committee meeting defined the no relation between them. The idiosyn-
cratic risk and audit quality defined positively affected and among no relationship. The idiosyncratic 
risk and firm size positively affects but exist no relation between them. Leverage also has no relation 
to idiosyncratic risk and they are positively affected on each other. 
 
Table 4. Regression analysis 
ido Coefficient Std. Err. P value [95% Conf. Interval] 
dul -11.71998 9.517197 0.0218 -30.37334 -6.933386 
bo 53.13435 27.04925 0.0149 -106.1499 -.118784 
ish 95.80385 37.81475 0.011 -169.9194 -21.68831 
oc -18.95626 32.44964 0.0559 -82.55638 -44.64386 
bs 4.363458 3.404686 0.0200 -11.03652 -2.309604 
ned 50.92537 22.40772 0.023 -94.84369 -7.007055 
bm 2.348668 2.592057 0.0365 -7.429007 -2.731671 
aci 37.71314 19.50617 0.053 -75.94454 -.5182561 
acm 2.222486 2.22012 0.0317 -6.57384 -2.128869 
aq 11.12266 13.66497 0.0416 -15.66018 -37.90551 
fs -2.740099 3.249036 0.0399 -9.108091 -3.627894 
lvg -35.02435 20.74867 0.091 -75.691 -5.642294
cons 66.87535 67.67968 0.323 -65.7744 -199.5251 
 
Now, the value of CEO duality indicates that holding everything else constant, one unit in-
creases in CEO duality will lead to the decrease of idiosyncratic risk by -11.7199unit. The negative 
sign with a value of the coefficient of CEO duality shows the negative relationship between idiosyn-
cratic risk and CEO duality. It means whenever CEO duality increases it will lead to the decrease of 
idiosyncratic risk. It is significant with the probability of 0.0128. 
The value of board ownership indicates that holding everything else constant, one unit in-
creases in board ownership will lead to the increase of idiosyncratic risk by 53.1343 units. The posi-
tive sign with a value of the coefficient of board ownership shows the positive connection between 
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board ownership and idiosyncratic risk. It means whenever board ownership increases it will lead to 
the increase in idiosyncratic risk. It is significant with the probability of 0.0149. 
The value of institutional ownership indicates that holding everything else constant, one unit 
increases in institutional ownership will lead to the increase of idiosyncratic risk by 95.8038 units. 
The positive sign with a value of the coefficient of institutional ownership shows the positive corre-
lation between institutional ownership and idiosyncratic risk. It means whenever institutional own-
ership increases it will lead to the increase of idiosyncratic risk. It is significant with the probability 
of 0.011. 
The value of ownership concentration indicates that holding everything else constant, one 
unit increases in ownership concentration will lead to the decrease of idiosyncratic risk by -18.9562 
units. The negative sign with a value of the coefficient of ownership concentration shows the nega-
tive relationship between ownership concentration and idiosyncratic risk. It means whenever owner-
ship concentration increases it will lead to the decrease of idiosyncratic risk. It is significant with the 
probability of 0.0559. 
The value of board size indicates that holding everything else constant, one unit increases in 
board size will lead to the increase of idiosyncratic risk by 4.3634 units. The positive sign with a 
value of the coefficient of board size shows the positive relationship between board size and idio-
syncratic risk. It means whenever board size increases it will lead to the increase of idiosyncratic 
risk. It is significant with the probability of 0.0200. 
The value of board independence indicates that holding everything else constant, one unit in-
creases in board independence will lead to the increase of idiosyncratic risk by 50.9253 units. The 
positive sign with a value of the coefficient of board independence shows the positive bond between 
board independence and idiosyncratic risk. It means whenever board independence increases it will 
lead to the increase in idiosyncratic risk. It is highly significant with the probability of 0.023. 
The value of board meeting indicates that holding everything else constant, one unit increas-
es in board meeting will lead to the increase of idiosyncratic risk by 2.3486 units. The positive sign 
with a value of the coefficient of board meeting shows the positive affiliation involving board meet-
ing and idiosyncratic risk. It means whenever board meeting increases it will lead to the increase of 
idiosyncratic risk. It is significant with the probability of 0.0365. 
The value of audit committee independence indicates that holding everything else constant, 
one unit increases in audit committee independence will lead to the increase of idiosyncratic risk by 
37.7131 units. The positive sign with a value of the coefficient of audit committee independence 
shows the positive association involving audit committee independence and idiosyncratic risk. It 
means whenever audit committee independence increases it will lead to the increase of idiosyncratic 
risk. It is significant with the probability of 0.053. 
The value of the audit committee meeting indicates that holding everything else constant, 
one unit increases in audit committee meeting will lead to the increase of idiosyncratic risk by 
2.2224 units. The positive sign with a value of the coefficient of audit committee meeting shows the 
positive correlation between audit committee meeting and idiosyncratic risk. It means whenever an 
audit committee meeting increases it will lead to the increase of idiosyncratic risk. It is significant 
with the probability of 0.0317. 
The value of audit quality indicates that holding everything else constant, one unit increases 
in audit quality will lead to the increase of idiosyncratic risk by 11.1226 units. The positive sign 
with a value of the coefficient of audit quality shows the positive relationship between audit quality 
and idiosyncratic risk. It means whenever audit quality increases it will lead to the increase in idio-
syncratic risk. It is significant with the probability of 0.0416. 
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Figure 1. Normality Graph 
 
Interpretation 
The mean value is always in the midpoint of this cover. The graph on Figure 1 shows the bell 
cover is symmetric. The data are divided two side half data or point life side of mean point, and half 
data or point right side of the mean point. The graph shows the standard deviation is linear pre-
dicted. The graph show data are normal distributing both side of mean value. 
 
Discussion 
Based on the literature, to my knowledge, the association between idiosyncratic risk and cor-
porate governance has not been previously studied in the context of a market with internal gover-
nance-control-characteristics such as the Pakistan market. The primary focus and conclusion of this 
study are that there is a clear and strong correlation between corporate governance and idiosyncratic 
risk in a market with internal-governance-control characteristics, such as the Pakistan markets. 
Moreover, the Pakistan market is a well-organized, well-functioning, fair and efficient market. Thus, 
idiosyncratic risk is relevant in such a market and is integral to good CG and organization perfor-
mance. 
Research is conducted in the association between idiosyncratic volatility and CG. The corpo-
rate governance focus of the study is on aspects board structure and composition, and on aspects of 
ownership and ownership structure. In addition, a potential link between CG and idiosyncratic risk 
is observed following an analysis of regression results for idiosyncratic volatility on corporate go-
vernance. 
However, the primary focal point of this study is on the association involving idiosyncratic 
risk and CG in a market with internal-governance-control characteristics, therefore the main aim of 
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Conclusion 
The primary conclusion of this study is that there is a clear affiliation between idiosyncratic 
risk and CG in a market with internal-governance-control characteristics. The primary conclusion of 
a relationship between idiosyncratic risk and CG is based on clear and strong relationships estab-
lished in this study idiosyncratic volatility and a number of internal-governance-control variables 
based on board structure and composition, and ownership and ownership structure. The primary 
conclusion of this study is supported by a highly significant regression coefficient and robust statis-
tics. A connection between idiosyncratic risk and corporate governance has implications for fund 
managers and investors alike, for the identification well governed, superior performing firms, for a 
given level of idiosyncratic risk. Moreover, the firm-level idiosyncratic risk may be identified by 
examining firm-specific, internal-governance-control-structures and characteristics. Thus, adding a 
new dimension to the predictive abilities of idiosyncratic volatility for investment return, firm value 
and performance. Ferreira and Laux (2007) put forward that higher idiosyncratic volatility fosters 
elements that are indications of good corporate governance, such as better decision making by man-
agement, better capital budgeting, and more efficient capital investment. They also put forward that 
corporate governance can have a direct impact on equity prices and on the efficiency of equity pric-
es. This is because element such as greater transparency, openness to the discipline of the market, 
and knowledgeable trading by institutions can work together to control the informational efficiency 
in stock prices (Gompers et al. 2003). Ferreira and Laux (2007) point out that even though greater 
transparency makes a firm more exposed to takeover, it also leads to greater information flow and 
potentially better outcomes for the firm. 
 
Suggestions for Future Research 
An option could be to conduct different statistical tests on the data. This paper has only 
checked the correlation with the actual values on corporate governance and idiosyncratic risk. Re-
searching the same variables with different data sets might suggest other statistical measures to be 
appropriate which could provide additional understanding. A suggestion could be to investigate if 
the year-to-year changes in corporate governance, idiosyncratic risk had a similar relationship. 
Another research could investigate the observed relationship further by for example by examining 
whether there is a potential causal link between these variables. 
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